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1. Introduction
The brokerage business model has been used since the pre-Internet era,
where the intermediary buys from the supplier (or producer) and owns the
goods first, and then sells it. This model plays a very important role in the
online business nowadays, as it enables fast and secure transactions without relying on a single merchant’s connection. Brokers have been known to
be active in business-to-business (B2B), businesss-to-consumer (B2C) and
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or peer-to-peer (P2P) markets. Although this
model is known to be very useful and practical, some issues have happened
since the broker may incorporate some certain strategies to increase his/her
sales, and it may damage even the supplier.
Consider the following real life case study. A broker B buys games from
the game developer G and sells these games to its customer. Since B is
considered as a broker, the price that has been set to B is certainly lower
than the retail price of the game itself. In order to maximise its sales, B is
happy to make its margin to be very low, and this way B will gain popularity
among the customers and attract more buyers. In particular, this is certainly
possible if B purchases the games from different countries, since usually the
price for each country will be different, due to the sales tax applied. This
action is certainly damaging the market and G will not be able to sell that
particular game with the retail price to the customers as they would have
preferred to acquire it from B instead. This issue can be solved by placing
required policies for the brokers. First of all, each broker must be licensed in
order to sell the games. The license is limited to the country of residence. The
game will be playable, if and only if, the required CD key sold by the broker
matches with the country where the game will be played. To give an example,
someone resides in the US will purchase a CD key from the broker. First of
all, he/she needs to be sure that the broker is a licensed retailer for US. Once
the CD key is issued by the broker, this CD key is only usable if it is used
in the US and not in other countries. Another scenario involves limitation of
the age restriction towards the game itself. For instance, consider the game
“God of War” that is restricted to people over 18 years old. A US online
reseller selles the activation key (or CD key) for this game. This price is
lower than the price of the same game available in Canada. There are two
issues need to be solved here. First, the buyer needs to be ensured that the
reseller is a genuine reseller, and the reseller needs to be sure that the buyer
is at least 18 years old. Subsequently, the activation key sold can only be
2

used in the US and not elsewhere. Hence, the buyer from Canada will not
be able to make use of this particular activation key.
Our Approach. In this paper, we intend to present a cryptographic primitive that aims to solve the above scenario. We make use of the notion of
optimistic fair exchange (OFE) and enhance this notion to enable policies
for both parties, namely the seller and the buyer (or the signer and the verifier, resp.). A trivial solution for enabling the above scenario would be that
prior to involving an OFE protocol, each participant will simply present an
evidence, for instance a copy of the identity card or license, to the other
participant, hence confirming that they satisfy the requirements. Nevertheless, this solution compromises the privacy of the users, and therefore it is
not ideal. Furthermore, providing such kind of evidence over the network
securely is rather challenging as well.
1.1. Optimistic Fair Exchange
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), first introduced by Asokan, Schunter
and Waidner [1], is a kind of protocols aiming to guarantee fairness for two
parties Alice and Bob exchanging digital items. An trusted third party named
“arbitrator” is needed in OFE, but involves only when there is a dispute
between exchanging parties. Since a large number of digital items such as
electronic checks and electronic airline tickets are implemented as digital
signatures, the optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures constitutes an
important part of any business transaction.
In a typical execution of optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures,
Alice first sends a partial signature to Bob. Bob verifies the validity of Alice’s
partial signature, and sends its full signature to Alice, after which Alice sends
her full signature back to Bob and completes the exchange. In the case there
is a network failure or Alice attempts to cheat by refusing to send her own full
signature, the arbitrator will convert Alice’s partial signature into a full one
and send it back to Bob. It is implicitly assumed that Bob should offer his
own full signature when asking the arbitrator for help, and the arbitrator will
send Bob’s full signature to Alice later. Thus at the end of this exchange,
either both Alice and Bob gain the other’s full signature, or neither does.
Thus the exchange is fair.
As a useful tool in applications such as contract signing and electronic
commerce, OFE has been extensively researched [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] since
its introduction. Several primitives are useful for the construction of OFE,
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including verifiably encrypted signatures [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], and sequentially two-party multisignatures [16]. It was further showed that OFE
can be constructed from OR signature [17], and from conventional signatures
and ring signatures [18].
In an orthogonal dimension, formal OFE security models [17, 18] are
proposed. While most optimistic fair exchange protocols are studied in the
certified-key model (also known as the registered-key model [19]) in which
the adversary is only allowed to make queries with respect to the registered
public keys, the security of optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting
and chosen-key model [18], where the adversary can choose its public key
arbitrarily probably without knowing the corresponding private keys, is more
desirable.
1.2. Our Contribution
In this paper, motivated by idea of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [20]
and ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE) [21], we introduce
the notion of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange (ABOFE), which can
be viewed as an extension of OFE, as a practical cryptographic solution to
the aforementioned scenario.
In ABOFE, each user satisfying a set of attributes is assigned a credential
by the credential center. This allows the signer Alice to generate a credentialprotected package in such a way that only verifiers that possess appropriate
credentials can convert it into a full signature, which naturally guarantees
that the verifier should satisfy some particular set of attributes.
We propose the syntax and also define a security model for ABOFE in the
multi-user setting under chosen-key attack. Our model captures the existing security requirements for OFE, namely, security against signers, security
against verifiers and security against the arbitrator. As suggested by the
respective names, they intend to cover the scenarios when the named party
is dishonest.
Finally, we propose a generic construction of ABOFE from the two well
established cryptographic primitives, OFE and CP-ABE, and provide the security proof of our proposal in the proposed model. Our generic construction
works in the standard model and does not involve any extra assumptions.
The efficiency of an instantiation about the generation construction is also
discussed.

4

1.3. Paper Organization
In the next section, we review the notions and security models of OFE and
CP-ABE, respectively. In Section 3, the syntax of ABOFE and its security
definitions are presented. Then we present our construction in Section 4. An
instantiation is descussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude our paper in
Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the following notations are used. For a finite set S,
s ← S denotes that an element is randomly chosen from S. By y ← AO (x),
we mean the algorithm A, on input x and having access to oracle O, outputs
y. By x := y, we mean variable x is assigned with the value of y.
Definition 1 (Access structure [22]). Let {P1 , · · · , Pn } be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1 ,··· ,Pn } is monotone if for any B, C: if B ∈ A
and B ⊆ C then C ⊆ A. An access structure (respectively, monotonic access
structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty
subsets of {P1 , · · · , Pn }, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1 ,··· ,Pn } \ {∅}. The sets in A are called
the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called unauthorized sets.
In this paper, the attributes will take the role of the parties and by an
access structure, we mean a monotone access structure. When we say a set
S satisfies an access structure A, we mean S ∈ A.
2.1. Ciphertext-Policy ABE
We review the notion and security model of ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption introduced in [23]. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme E comprises four efficient algorithms: E := (Setup, Encrypt,
KeyGen, Decrypt).
Setup(1k , U ). The setup algorithm takes as input security parameter 1k and
attribute universe description U , and outputs the public parameters PM and
a master key MK.
Encrypt(PM, M, A). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PM, a message M , and an access structure A over the universe of
attributes, and outputs a ciphertext CT such that only a user that possesses
5

a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure A will be able to decrypt
the ciphertext. It is assumed that the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(MK, S). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master key
MK and a set of attributes S, and outputs a private key SK.
Decrypt(PM, CT, SK). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PM, a ciphertext CT, which contains an access policy A, and a
private key SK, which is a private key for a set of attributes S. If the set of
attributes S satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt
the ciphertext and returns a message M .
Correctness for a CP-ABE scheme E states that Decrypt(PM, Encrypt(PM, M, A),
KeyGen(MK, S)) = M , for any set of attributes S that satisfies the access
structure A.
2.1.1. Security Model.
The full security for CP-ABE [23] is described by a security game between
a challenger and an adversary. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup The challenger runs Setup algorithm and sends the public parameters
PM to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary adaptively queries the challenger for private keys
corresponding to sets of attributes S1 , · · · , Sq1 . For the query with respect to
Sk , the challenger responds with a secret key outputted by KeyGen(MK, Sk ).
Challenge The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1 ,
and an access structure A such that none of the previous sets S1 , · · · , Sq1
satisfies the access structure. The challenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1},
and encrypts Mb under A, producing CT. It sends CT to the attacker.
Phase 2 The adversary adaptively queries the challenger for private keys
corresponding to sets of attributes Sq1 +1 , · · · , Sq , with the restriction that
none of these satisfies A. For the query with respect to Sk , the challenger
responds with a secret key outputted by KeyGen(MK, Sk ).
Guess The adversary outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as Pr[b0 = b] − 21 .
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Definition 2. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is fully
secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage
in the above security game.
2.2. Optimistic Fair Exchange
We review the notion and security model of the optimistic fair exchange
protocol introduced in [24].
Definition 3. An optimistic fair exchange scheme involves the users (signers and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and is formalized by the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms:
• SetupTTP : On input a security parameter 1k , the algorithm generates a
secret key ASK, and a public key AP K of the arbitrator.
• SetupUser : On input 1k and (optionally) AP K, it outputs a secret/public
key pair (SK, P K). For a user Ui , we use (SKi , P Ki ) to denote the
user’s key pair.
• Sig and Ver: Sig(M, SKi , AP K), outputs a (full) signature σ on message M of user Ui , while Ver(M , σ, P Ki , AP K) outputs > or ⊥, indicating σ is Ui ’s valid full signature on M or not, respectively.
• PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and partial verification algorithms respectively. PSig(M, SKi , AP K) outputs a partial signature
σP , while PVer(M, σP , P Ki , AP K) outputs > or ⊥.
• Res: This is the resolution algorithm. Res(M, σP , ASK, P Ki ) outputs
a full signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial
signature.
Correctness property states that
• Ver(M, Sig(M, SKi , AP K), P Ki , AP K) = >,
• PVer(M, PSig(M, SKi , AP K), P Ki , AP K) = >,
• Ver(M, Res(M, PSig(M, SKi , AP K), ASK, P Ki ), P Ki , AP K) = >.
Resolution ambiguity property states that
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• any “resolved signature” Res(M, PSig(M, SKi , AP K), ASK, P Ki ) is computationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature” Sig(M, SKi , AP K).
The security of an optimistic fair exchange scheme consists of three aspects:
security against signers, security against verifiers, and security against the
arbitrator. The security models of them in the multi-user setting and chosenkey model are reviewed below.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. We require that any PPT adversary A
succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
(ASK, AP K)
(M, σP , P KA )
σ
success of A

←
←
←
:=

SetupTTP (1k )
AORes (AP K)
Res(M, σP , ASK, P KA )
[PVer(M, σP , P KA , AP K) = >
∧ Ver(M, σ, P KA , AP K) = ⊥]

where the resolution oracle ORes takes as input a valid partial signature σP of
user Ui on message M (i.e. (M, σP , P Ki ) such that PVer(M, σP , P Ki , AP K) =
>) and outputs a full signature σ on M under P Ki . In other words, no signer
should be able to produce a partial signature that looks good to a verifier
but cannot be resolved to a full signature by the honest arbitrator.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. We require that any PPT adversary
A succeeds with at most negligible probability in the following experiment.
(ASK, AP K)
(SKA , P KA )
(M, σ)
success of A

←
←
←
:=

SetupTTP (1k )
SetupUser (AP K)
AOPSig ,ORes (AP K, P KA )
[Ver(M, σ, P KA , AP K) = >
∧ (M, ·, P KA ) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )]

where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment, the partial signing
oracle OPSig takes a message M as input and outputs a partial signature σP
on M under P KA , and Query(A, ORes ) is the set of queries made by A to
oracle ORes . In other words, no verifier should be able to complete any partial
signature σP into a full signature, without explicitly asking the arbitrator to
do so. Note that there is no need to provide A with the signing oracle OSig ,
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as the resolution ambiguity property guarantees that it can be simulated by
OPSig and ORes .
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. We require that any PPT twostage adversary A = (A1 , A2 ) succeeds with at most negligible probability
in the following experiment.
(AP K, ASK ∗ ) ← A1 (1k )
(SKA , P KA ) ← SetupUser (AP K)
O

(M, σ) ← A2 PSig (ASK ∗ , AP K, P KA )
success of A := [Ver(M, σ, P KA , AP K) = >
∧ M 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )]
where ASK ∗ is A1 ’s state information, which might not be the corresponding
private key of AP K, oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment, and
Query(A, OPSig ) is the set of queries made by A to oracle OPSig . In other
words, the arbitrator should not be able to produce a full signature without
explicitly asking the signer to generate a partial one.
3. Attribute-based Optimistic Fair Exchange
We adapt the definitions and security models of OFE from various literatures for our attribute-based OFE. In ABOFE, besides the traditional
secret/public key pair, each user also possesses a credential, generated by
the credential center, corresponding to a set of attributes the user satisfies.
We require that a user that does not possess a set of attributes should not
be able to gain other users’ full signatures. Thus a full signature will not be
sent by the signer in ABOFE, which is different from the case in OFE.
With this in mind, we introduce the the algorithms of which ABOFE
scheme consists.
Definition 4. An attribute-based optimistic fair exchange scheme involves
the users, the credential center and the arbitrator, and consists of the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms:
• PMGen: On input 1k and attribute universe description U where k
is a security parameter, this algorithm outputs a system parameter PM
and a credential secret key CK.
9

• SetupTTP : On input 1k , the algorithm generates a secret key ASK, and
a public key APK of the arbitrator.
• SetupUser : On input 1k and (optionally) APK, it outputs a secret/public
key pair (SK, PK). For a user Ui , we use (SKi , PKi ) to denote the user’s
key pair.
• SetupCred : On input the credential secret key CK and a set of attributes
S, the attribute key generation algorithm outputs a credential CDS corresponding to the set of attributes S.
• TranP : The transaction promise generation algorithm TranP (m1 , m2 ,
SKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) takes as input two messages m1 and m2 , respectively, user Ui ’s secret key SKi , the arbitrator’s public key APK, the
system parameter PM and two access structure A1 and A2 over the
universe of attributes, respectively. This algorithm outputs a transaction promise ω.
• TPVer: The transaction promise verification algorithm TPVer(m1 , m2 ,
ω, PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) takes as input two message m1 and m2 , respectively, a transaction promise ω, user Ui ’s public key PKi , the arbitrator’s public key APK, the system parameter PM, and two access
structure A1 and A2 , respectively. The algorithm outputs > indicating
valid or ⊥ indicating invalid.
• TranS : The transaction for signer algorithm TranS (m, SKi , APK, PM, A)
takes as input a message m, user Ui ’s secret key SKi , the arbitrator’s
public key APK, the system parameter PM, and an access structure A.
The algorithm outputs a credential-protected package π.
• TranV : The transaction for verifier algorithm TranV (m, π, PKi , APK,
PM, CDS ) takes a message m, a credential-protected package π, user
Ui ’s public key PKi , the arbitrator’s public key APK, the system parameter PM, and a credential CDS . This algorithm outputs a full signature
σ or ⊥ indicating failure.
• Ver: The full signature verification algorithm Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK) outputs > indicating valid or ⊥ indicating invalid.
• ResUser : The resolution for user algorithm ResUser (m1 , m2 , ω, SKj , PKi ,
APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) takes as input two message m1 and m2 , respectively,
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a transaction promise ω, and user Uj ’s secret key SKj , the system parameter PM, and two access structure A1 and A2 , respectively. This
algorithm outputs a resolution request request.
• ResTTP : The resolution for arbitrator algorithm ResTTP (m, PKi , A,
request, ASK) takes as input input a message m, user Ui ’s public key
PKi , an access structure A, a resolution request request and the arbitrator’s secret key ASK. It outputs two credential-protected packages π1
and π2 , respectively.
Correctness states that, for PMGen(1k ) → (PM, CK), SetupTTP (1k ) →
(ASK, APK), SetupUser (1k ) → (SKi , PKi ), SetupUser (1k ) → (SKj , PKj ), TranP
(m1 , m2 , SKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) → ω, TranS (m1 , SKi , APK, PM, A2 ) → π1 ,
TranS (m2 , SKj , APK, PM, A1 ) → π2 , ResUser (m1 , m2 , ω, SKj , PKi , APK, PM,
A1 , A2 ) → request, ResTTP (m1 , PKi , A2 , request, ASK) → (π̃1 , π̃2 ), SetupCred
(CK, S) → CDS where the sets of attributes S satisfies the access structures
A1 , and SetupCred (CK, S 0 ) → CDS 0 where the sets of attributes S 0 satisfies
the access structures A2 , the following conditions hold:
• TPVer(m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = >.
• Ver(m1 , TranV (m1 , π1 , PKi , APK, PM, CDS 0 ), PKi , APK) = >.
• Ver(m2 , TranV (m2 , π2 , PKj , APK, PM, CDS ), PKj , APK) = >.
• Ver(m1 , TranV (m1 , π̃1 , PKi , APK, PM, CDS 0 ), PKi , APK) = >.
• Ver(m2 , TranV (m2 , π̃2 , PKj , APK, PM, CDS ), PKj , APK) = >.
Resolution ambiguity states that, any “resolved credential-protected packages” π̃1 and π̃2 outputted by ResAbr are computationally indistinguishable from the “actual credential-protected packages” π1 and π2 generated
by TranS , respectively.
3.1. A Typical Usage of ABOFE
For simplicity, we will describe a typical usage of ABOFE between two
users Alice and Bob. Before the exchange phase, the credential center runs
PMGen to set up the public parameters and keep the credential secret key
as private. Alice and Bob acquire their respective credentials generated by
SetupCred from the credential center. Besides, the arbitrator sets its key
11

pair by invoking SetupTTP . Alice and Bob generate their own key pairs by
invoking SetupUser , respectively.
Suppose Alice intends to exchange her own full signature σ1 on message
m1 for Bob’s full signature σ2 on message m2 . Besides, Alice should satisfy
an access structure A1 , and Bob should satisfy an access structure A2 . The
exchange phase consists of three steps.
1. Alice invokes TranP to generate a transaction promise ω on message
m1 and m2 with respect to access structures A1 and A2 . Alice sends ω
to Bob.
2. Bob invokes TPVer to ensure the validity of ω. Bob then invokes
TranS to generate a credential-protected package πB on message m2
with respect to access structure A1 . Bob sends πB to Alice.
3. If satisfying the access structure A1 , Alice can invoke TranV to gain
a full signature σB of Bob’s. Then Alice invokes TranS to generate a
credential-protected package πA on message m1 with respect to access
structures A2 . Alice sends πA to Bob, who can invoke TranV to gain
Alice’s full signature σA if satisfying the access structure A2 .
Note that in the normal cases, the exchange will finish and both Alice
and Bob can gain the full signature of the other’s. In the case Alice refuses to
send her credential-protected package πA in the third step, or that credentialprotected package is created with respect to improper access structures, Bob
can approach the arbitrator for assistance. Specifically, he approaches the
arbitrator and sends a resolution request generated by invoking ResUser . To
make a resolution, the arbitrator invokes ResTTP to generate two credentialprotected packages π̃1 and π̃2 . π̃1 is sent to Bob, and π̃2 is sent to Alice.
Thus both Alice and Bob can invoke TranV to gain the other’s full signature
if satisfying the expectant attributes.
3.2. Security model
We modify the traditional OFE model to make it suitable in the attributebased setting.
• Security Against Signers: This property guarantees that a transaction promise generated by a signer can always be resolved to a full
signature of the signer’s if the arbitrator honestly makes a resolution
and the verifier satisfies the expectant attributes. Formally, we consider
12

the following experiment, in which the adversary A models a dishonest
signer that can even have access to the credential secret key and the
verifier’s secret key.
Experiment SAS:
(PM, CK)

←

PMGen(1k , U )

(ASK, APK)

←

SetupTTP (1k )

(SKB , PKB )

←

SetupUser (1k )

(m∗1 , m∗2 , ω ∗ , PKA , A1 , A2 , S)

←

AORes (PM, CK, APK, SKB , PKB )

CDS

←

SetupCred (CK, S)

request∗

←

ResUser (m∗1 , m∗2 , ω ∗ , SKB , APK, PM, A1 , A2 )

(π1∗ , π2∗ )

←

ResTTP (m∗1 , PKA , A2 , request∗ , ASK)

∗

←

TranV (m∗1 , π1∗ , PKA , APK, PM, CDS )

success of A

:=

[TPVer(m∗1 , m∗2 , ω ∗ , PKA , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = >

σ

∧ Ver(m∗1 , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = ⊥]

where S is a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure A2 , the
resolution for arbitrator oracle ORes takes as input (m, PKi , A, request),
and outputs ResTTP (m, PKi , A, request, ASK). In this experiment, the
adversary can arbitrarily choose a public key PKi , and it may not know
the corresponding private key of PKi .
• Security Against Verifiers: This property captures two cases: the
first case is that no verifier, even given the credential secret key, should
be able to generate a full signature of the signer’s while not possessing a
credential-protected package. The second case is that the verifier that
does not possess the expectant attributes should not be able to generate a full signature even if given a corresponding credential-protected
package. Formally, we require that no PPT adversary A, who models
a dishonest verifier, succeeds with non-negligible probability in either
of the following two experiments:
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Experiment SAV1:
(PM, CK)
(ASK, APK)
(SKA , PKA )
(m∗ , σ ∗ )
success of A

←
←
←
←
:=

PMGen(1k , U )
SetupTTP (1k )
SetupUser (1k , APK)
AOTranP ,ORes (PM, CK, APK, PKA )
[Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >
∧ (m∗ , PKA , ·, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )]

where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment, oracle OTranP
takes as input (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) and outputs TranP (m1 , m2 , SKA , APK, PM,
A, A0 ), and Query(A, ORes ) is the set of queries A issued to the resolution oracle. Note that there is no need to provide A with access to the
transaction for signer oracle OTranS , as resolution ambiguity property
guarantees that its functionality could be achieved by executing OTranP
and ORes .
Experiment SAV2:
(PM, CK)
(ASK, APK)
(SKA , PKA )
(m∗ , σ ∗ )
success of A

←
←
←
←
:=

PMGen(1k , U )
SetupTTP (1k )
SetupUser (1k , APK)
AOSetupCred ,OTranP ,ORes (PM, APK, PKA )
[Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >
∧ for any S ∈ Query(A, OSetupCred ),
for any (m∗ , PKA , A, ·) ∈ Query(A, ORes ),
S does not satisfy A]

where oracles OTranP , ORes and Query(A, ORes ) are described in the
previous experiment, oracle OSetupCred takes as input a set of attributes
S, and outputs a credential CDS , and Query(A, OSetupCred ) is the set
of queries A issued to the oracle OSetupCred .
• Security Against the Arbitrator: This property guarantees that
even when given the credential secret key, the arbitrator should not be
able to create a valid full signature unless it has seen a corresponding
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transaction promise. Formally, we consider the following experiment,
in which the two-stage adversary A = (A1 , A2 ) models the dishonest
arbitrator that may even have access the master key.
Experiment SAA:
(PM, CK) ← PMGen(1k , U )
(APK, ASK∗ ) ← A1 (PM, MK)
(SKA , PKA ) ← SetupUser (1k , APK)
OTran

P
(PM, CK, ASK∗ , APK, PKA )
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) ← A2
success of A := [Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >
∧ (m∗ , ·, ·, ·) 6∈ Query(A, OTranP )]

where the partial signing oracle OTranP is described in the previous
experiment, ASK∗ is A’s state information, which might not be the
corresponding secret key of APK, and Query(A, OTranP ) is the set of
queries A issued to oracle OTranP .
Definition 5. An attribute-based optimistic fair exchange scheme is said to
be secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if there is no PPT
adversary that wins any of the experiments above with non-negligible probability.
4. Construction
In this section, we give a generic construction of ABOFE that is secure
in our defined model.
Let E := (Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt) be a ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption scheme and OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver,
Res) be a conventional optimistic fair exchange scheme. Below are the details
of of our generic construction of an attribute-based optimistic fair exchange
scheme.
• PMGen: On input 1k and attribute universe description U , this algorithm runs E.Setup(1k , U ) → (PM, MK). The public parameter and
credential secret key are set as PM := PM and CK := MK, respectively.
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• SetupTTP : On input 1k , this algorithm runs OFE.SetupTTP (1k ) →
(ASK, AP K). The arbitrator’s secret and public key pair is set as
ASK := ASK and APK := AP K.
• SetupUser : This algorithm runs OFE.SetupUser (1k , AP K) → (SKi , P Ki ).
The user’s secret and public key pair is set as SKi := SKi , PKi := P Ki .
• SetupCred : On input the credential secret key CK and a set of attributes
S, this algorithm runs E.KeyGen (MK, S) → SK. The credential is set
as CDS := SK.
• TranP : Taking as input (m1 , m2 , SKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ), user Ui runs
OFE.PSig(m1 , SKi , APK) → σP , and generates a non-repudiation information θ about the transaction2 with respect to the tuple (σP , m1 ,
m2 , A1 , A2 ). The transaction promise ω is set as (σP , θ)3 .
• TPVer: Taking as input (m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ), it outputs
OFE.PVer(m1 , σP , PKi , APK).
• TranS : Taking as input (m, SKi , APK, PM, A), user Ui runs OFE.Sig(m,
SKi , APK) → s, and then encrypts s under the access structure A, i.e.,
E.Encrypt(PM, s, A) → CT. The credential-protected package is set as
π := CT.
• TranV : Taking as input (m, π, PKi , APK, PM, CDS ), the verifier that
possesses a set of attributes S that satisfies the access structure A will
be able to convert the credential-protected package to a full signature.
The verifier outputs σ ← E.Decrypt(PM, π, CDS ).
2

This is used to identify the transaction that is going on and will be necessary
when the arbitrator makes a resolution. Typically this can be achieved by signing
σP ||m1 ||m2 ||A1 ||A2 using an independent signature key pair.
3
In most research of optimistic fair exchange, it is normally assumed that only the
full signatures are useful to the exchanging parties. Even if Bob holds a partial signature
from Alice, Bob can not acquire Alice’s service, since only the full signature represents the
commitment of a service. Thus, for simplicity and clarity, we send the partial signature σP
in clear. In practice, if we would like to achieve the property that Bob cannot gain Alice’s
partial signature unless he satisfies some attributes, then Alice can encrypt σP under a
proper access structure.
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• Ver: Taking as input (m, σ, PKi , APK), it outputs OFE.Ver(m, σ, PKi ,
APK).
• ResUser : Taking as input (m1 , m2 , ω, SKj , PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ), it runs
OFE.Sig(m2 , SKj APK) → σ2 . The resolution request is set as request :=
(m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A1 ).
• ResTTP : Taking as input (m, PKi , A, request, ASK), the arbitrator firstly
parses request as (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A1 ), and checks whether TPVer
(m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = > and whether Ver(m2 , σ2 , PKj ,
APK) = >. If either does not hold, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, the arbitrator parses ω as (σP , θ), computes σ1 ← OFE.Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi )
and then encrypts σ1 under the access structure A2 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM,
σ1 , A2 ) → CT1 . The arbitrator also encrypts σ2 under the access structure A1 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A1 ) → CT2 . The credential-protected
packages are set as π1 := CT1 and π2 := CT2 .
4.1. Security Analysis
Regarding the security of our generic construction of ABOFE, we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Our generic construction of ABOFE is secure in the multi-user
setting and chosen-key model if the optimistic fair exchange scheme OFE is
secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model and the ciphertextpolicy attribute-based encryption scheme E is fully secure.
We prove Theorem 1 by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Security against Signers). The generic construction is secure
against signers if OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver, Res) is secure against signers.
Proof. To show security against signers, we convert any adversary A that
wins the experiment SAS into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against
signers of OFE. Recall that A0 gets AP K as input and has access to oracle
0
ORes
. A0 runs PMGen(1k , U ) → (PM, CK) and invokes A on input PM, CK
and APK := AP K.
Given a resolution for arbitrator query (m, PKi , A, request) to ORes , A0
firstly parses request as (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A0 ) and checks whether TPVer
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(m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A0 , A) = > and whether Ver(m2 , σ2 , PKj , APK) =
>. If either does not hold, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, A0 parses ω as (σP , θ),
0
and makes a query (m, σP , PKi ) to its own oracle ORes
. Denote the an0
0
swer from ORes is σ1 . A encrypts σ1 under the access structure A, i.e.,
E.Encrypt(PM, σ1 , A) → CT1 . A0 also encrypts σ2 under the access structure
A0 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A0 ) → CT2 . The credential-protected packages are
set as π1 := CT1 and π2 := CT2 . A0 returns (π1 , π2 ) to A.
It can be seen that the resolution for arbitrator oracle ORes is perfectly
simulated by A0 . Finally, A outputs a tuple (m∗1 , m∗2 , (σP∗ , θ∗ ), PKA , A1 , A2 , S)
where the set of attributes S satisfies the access structure A2 . A0 outputs
(m∗1 , σP∗ , PKA ).
Denote (π1∗ , π2∗ ) as the output of ResTTP (m∗1 , PKA , A2 , Request∗ , ASK),
and σ ∗ as the output of TranV (m∗1 , π1∗ , PKA , APK, PM, CDS ) where CDS =
SetupCred (CK, S). Due to the fact that the set of attributes S satisfies the access structure A2 , σ ∗ is in fact also the output of OFE.Res(m∗1 , σP∗ , ASK, PKA ).
Since TPVer(m∗1 , m∗2 , (σP∗ , θ∗ ), PKA , APK, PM, A1 , A2 ) = > but Ver(m∗1 , σ ∗ ,
PKA , APK) = ⊥, it means OFE.PVer (m∗1 , σP∗ , P KA , AP K) = > but OFE.Ver
(m∗1 , σ ∗ , P KA , AP K) = ⊥. Thus if A succeeds in the experiment, A0 also
succeeds with the same probability in breaking the security against signers
of OFE.
2
Lemma 2 (Security against Verifiers). The generic construction is secure against verifiers if OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig, Ver, Res)
is secure against verifiers and the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
E := (Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Decrypt) is fully secure.
Proof. To show security against verifiers, we consider the experiments SAV1
and SAV2, respectively. We firstly convert any adversary A that wins the experiment SAV1 into an adversary A0 that breaks the security against verifiers
of OFE.
0
Recall that A0 gets (AP K, P KA ) as input and has access to oracles OPSig
0
and ORes
. A0 runs PMGen(1k , U ) → (PM, MK) and invokes A on input
PM, CK, APK := AP K and PKA := P KA .
Given a transaction promise query (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) to oracle OTranP , A0
0
0
makes a query m to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote the answer from OPSig
is
0
σP . A returns (σP , θ) to A where θ is a non-repudiation information about
the transaction with respect to the tuple (σP , m1 , m2 , A1 , A2 ).
Given a resolution for arbitrator query (m, PKi , A, request) to ORes , A0
firstly parses request as (m2 , ω, PKj , σ2 , A0 ) and checks whether TPVer
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(m1 , m2 , ω, PKi , APK, PM, A0 , A) = > and whether Ver(m2 , σ2 , PKj , APK)
= >. If either does not hold, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, A0 parses ω as
0
(σP , θ), and makes a query (m, σP , PKi ) to its own oracle ORes
. Denote the
0
0
answer from ORes is σ1 . A encrypts σ1 under the access structure A, i.e.,
E.Encrypt(PM, σ1 , A) → CT1 . A0 also encrypts σ2 under the access structure
A0 , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A0 ) → CT2 . The credential-protected packages are
set as π1 := CT1 and π2 := CT2 . A0 returns (π1 , π2 ) to A.
It can be seen that the oracles OPSig and ORes are perfectly simulated by
0
A . Finally, A outputs a tuple (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) =
>. This means OFE.Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , P KA , AP K) = >. A0 outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ).
Since A is prohibited from making a query (m∗ , PKA , ·, ·) to oracle ORes , A0
has never made a query with respect to a tuple (m∗ , ·, PKA ) to its own oracle
O0 Res . If A succeeds in the experiment SAV1, A0 also succeeds in breaking the
security against verifiers of OFE. Thus A0 ’s advantage is also non-negligible.
Next, we consider the experiment SAV2. We convert any adversary A that
wins the experiment SAV2 into an algorithm B that breaks the full security
of the encryption scheme E.
Recall that B gets PM as input and can query its own challenger for private keys corresponding to a sequence of sets of attributes. B runs SetupTTP (1k )
→ (ASK, APK) and SetupUser (1k , APK) → (SKA , PKA ), and invokes A as a
subroutine by forwarding PM := PM, APK and PKA .
When A makes a query S to oracle OSetupCred , B supplies S to its own
challenger and forwards the reply to A. When A makes a transaction
promise query (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) to oracle OTranP , B runs TranP (m1 , m2 , SKA ,
APK, PM, A1 , A2 )ω and send ω to A as the reply.
Suppose A makes q valid resolution for arbitrator queries to ORes . B
chooses a random value z ∈ {1, · · · , q}. When A makes a j-th resolution
query (mj , , PKj , Aj , requestj ) to ORes , if j 6= z, B runs ResTTP (mz , PKj , Aj ,
requestj , ASK) and sends the outputs to A as the reply. When j = z and
PKz 6= PKA , B aborts and returns failure. When j = z and PKz = PKA ,
B parses requestz as (m2 , ωj , PKi , σ2 , A0z ) and parses ωz as (σP z , θz ). B runs
OFE.Res(mz , σP z , ASK, PKA ) → σz , randomly chooses M1 that is of the same
bit length with σz , and sends M0 := σz , M1 and the access structure Az to
its own challenger. Denote the challenge ciphertext is CT. B also encrypts
σ2 under the access structure A0z , i.e., E.Encrypt(PM, σ2 , A0 ) → CT0 . The
credential-protected packages are set as π1 := CT and π2 := CT0 . A0 returns
(π1 , π2 ) to A as the reply to the z-th resolution for arbitrator query.
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Finally A either outputs failure or wins by outputting a tuple (m∗ , σ ∗ )
such that Ver(m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK) = >. Note that when A wins, A must
have made a resolution query (m∗ , PKA , ·, ·) to ORes . Otherwise the analysis
of this type of attack is covered in the experiment SAV1 discussed above. If
m∗ = mz , PKA = PKz , and A2 = A0z , then B outputs 0. Otherwise, B outputs
a random bit.
If the challenge ciphertext CT is the encryption of σz (i.e., b = 0), CT
is a valid attribute-related signature and the distribution of B’s view in the
simulated environment is identical with that in the real attack environment.
If the challenge ciphertext CT is the encryption of M1 (i.e., b = 1), CT has no
information on the full signature of a message mz and B’s chance of forging a
valid full signature on message mz (with respect to PKA ) is negligible. Thus
if A in the real experiment SAV2 wins with non-negligible probability, then
B wins with non-negligible probability in breaking the full security of the
encryption scheme E.
2
Lemma 3 (Security against the Arbitrator). The generic construction
is secure against the arbitrator if OFE = (SetupTTP , SetupUser , PSig, PVer, Sig,
Ver, Res) is secure against the arbitrator.
Proof. To show security against the arbitrator, we convert any adversary A
that wins the experiment SAA into an adversary A0 that breaks the security
against the arbitrator of OFE. A firstly chooses a public adjudication key
APK and outputs it, keeps a corresponding secret state information ASK∗
private. A0 sets AP K := APK, gets P KA as input, and has access to ora0
cles OPSig
. A0 runs PMGen(1k , U ) → (PM, CK) and forwards PM, CK and
PKA := P KA to A.
Given a transaction promise query (m1 , m2 , A, A0 ) to oracle OTranP , A0
0
0
makes a query m to its own oracle OPSig
. Denote the answer from OPSig
is
0
σP . A returns (σP , θ) to A where θ is a non-repudiation information about
the transaction with respect to the tuple (σP , m1 , m2 , A1 , A2 ).
It can be seen that the oracle OTranP is perfectly simulated by A0 . Finally,
A outputs a tuple (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that Ver (m∗ , σ ∗ , PKA , APK = >. This
means OFE.Ver (m∗ , σ ∗ , P KA , AP K) = >. A0 outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ). Since A
is prohibited from making a query (m∗ , ·, ·, ·) to oracle OTranP , A0 has never
0
made a query message m∗ to its own oracle OPSig
. If A succeeds in the
0
experiment SAV2, A also succeeds with the same probability in breaking the
security against the arbitrator of OFE.
2
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5. Instantiation
In the following, we provide an instantiation to demonstrate the flexibility of our generic construction. It was shown in [18] that OFE secure in
the multi-user setting and chosen key model can be constructed from conventional signatures and ring signatures. More specifically, in this paradigm, the
partial signature in OFE is a conventional signature, and the full signature
in OFE is the partial signature, together with a two party ring signature
generated between the signer and the arbitrator. The authors [18] suggest a
concrete OFE scheme can be built on waters signature scheme [25] in group
of composite order and Shacham-Waters’ ring signature scheme [26] so that
they share the same set of system parameters. For the CP-ABE scheme,
we employ the one proposed by Lewko and Waters in [23], which is known
to be fully secure. Note that there is a global setup process before execution of the scheme due to the requirement of having such a setup process of
Shacham-Waters’ ring signature.
Global Setup : On input 1k where k is a security parameter, the setup
algorithm generates a multiplicative cyclic group G of composite order n1
where n1 = pq and a bilinear pairing e : G × G → GT where GT is a
multiplicative group of order n1 . Let Gp and Gq be the cyclic order-p and
order-q subgroups of G, respectively. Let g be a generator of G and h be a
generator of Gq . It then chooses random exponents a, b ∈ ZZn1 and sets
A := g a , B := g b , Â := ha .
Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a collision-resistant hash function. The setup
algorithm picks Waters hash generators
u0 , u1 , · · · , uk ← G.
The common reference string is set as (n1 , A, B, Â, u0 , u1 , · · · , uk , H0 ).
After the global setup is finished, the algorithms in ABOFE can be executed
as follows.
• PMGen: On input 1k where k is a security parameter, the setup
algorithm outputs a multiplicative cyclic group Ĝ of order n2 where
n2 = p1 p2 p3 (3 distinct primes) and a bilinear pairing ê : Ĝ × Ĝ → ĜT
where ĜT is a multiplicative group of order n2 . Let Ĝpi denote the
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subgroup of order pi in Ĝ. Let gi be a generator of Ĝpi and H1 : ĜT →
{0, 1}l be a collision-resistant hash function. It then chooses random
exponents α, c, γ ∈ ZZn , and for each attribute i ∈ U , it chooses a
random group element hi ∈ Ĝp1 . Let SE be a symmetric encryption
scheme whose symmetric key space is {0, 1}l . The public parameters
PM are set as
n2 , g1 , Â, g1c , g1γ , e(g1 , g1 )α , H1 , h1 , · · · , h|U | , SE.
The master key are set as MK := (g1α , g3 ).
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator chooses a random exponent y ∈ ZZn1 , and
sets APK := g y ∈ G and sk := Ay ∈ G.
• SetupUser : Each user Ui randomly chooses exponents x1 , x3 ∈ ZZn1 and
computes ḡ1 = g x1 and ḡ3 = g x3 . Besides, user Ui randomly chooses
ḡ2 , ū0 , ū1 , · · · , ūk ← G and sets PKi := (ḡ1 , ḡ2 , ḡ3 , ū0 , ū1 , · · · , ūk ) and
SK := (ḡ2x1 , Ax3 ).
• SetupCred : On input the credential secret key CK and a set of attributes S, the algorithm chooses random exponents t, u ∈ ZZn2 , and
random elements R, R0 , R00 , {Ri }i∈S ∈ Gp3 (this can be done by raising
a generator of Gp3 to random exponents modulo n2 ). The credential is:
S, K = g1α g1ct g1γu R, K 0 = g1u R0 , K 00 = g t R00 , Ki = hti Ri for i ∈ S.
• TranP : TranP (mA , mB , SKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )), where M is an
L × N matrix and ρ a map from each row Mj of M to an attribute
ρ(j), and M 0 is an L0 × N 0 matrix and ρ0 a map from each row Mj0 of
M 0 to an attribute ρ0 (j), does as follows:
1. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mA ),
2. Choose a random exponent r ∈ ZZn1 and computes
S1 =

ḡ2x1

0

· (ū

k
Y
i=1

3. σP is set as (S1 , S2 ).
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r
i r
ūm
i ) , and S2 = g .

4. Generate a non-repudiation information θ about the transaction
with respect to the tuple (σP , mA , mB , (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )). The
transaction promise ω is set as (σP , θ).
• TPVer: TPVer(mA , mB , ω, PKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )) does as follows.
1. Parse ω as (σP , θ).
2. Verify whether θ is a non-repudiation information about the transaction with respect to the tuple (σP , mA , mB , (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )). If
so, it continues; otherwise, it aborts and outputs ⊥.
3. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mA ), and verify whether
e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , ū0

k
Y

m

ūj j ) = e(ḡ1 , ḡ2 )

j=1

holds. If so, it outputs >; if not, it outputs ⊥.
• TranS : TranS (m, SKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ)), where M is an L × N matrix
and ρ a map from each row Mj of M to an attribute ρ(j), does as
follows:
1. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (m),
2. Choose a random exponent r ∈ ZZn1 and computes
S1 = ḡ2x1 · (ū0

k
Y

r
i r
ūm
i ) , and S2 = g .

i=1

3. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (m||S1 ||S2 ||PKi ).
4. Choose two random exponents t0 , t1 ∈ ZZn1 and sets
C00 = (ḡ3 /B)ht0 , π0 = ((ḡ3 /B)ht0 )t0 , C10 = ht1 , π1 = ((APK/B)−1 ht1 )t1 .
5. Choose r0 ← ZZn1 , and compute first t = t1 + t2 and then
S10

x3

=A

0

· (u

k
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r · Ât , and S20 = g r .

j=1
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6. Choose a random vector v ∈ ZZN
n2 , denoted v = (s, v2 , · · · , vN ).
For each row Mj of M , it chooses a random rj ∈ ZZn2 .
7. Choose a random element D ∈ GT , computes sk = H1 (D), and
uses sk as a symmetric key of SE to encrypt the bit strings
S1 ||S2 ||S10 ||S20 ||C00 ||C10 ||π0 ||π1 and gains a ciphertext c̃.
8. The credential-protected package π is set as
c̃, C0 = De(g1 , g1 )αs , C = g1s , C 0 = (g1γ )s ,
−r

r

Cj = (g1c )Mj ·v hρ(j)j , Dj = g1j , for j = 1, · · · , L.
• TranV : TranV (m, π, PKi , APK, PM, CDS ) does as follows.
P
1. Computes constants ωj ∈ ZZn2 such that ρ(j)∈S ωj Mj = (1, 0, · · · , 0).
It then computes
Y
ê(C, K)ê(C 0 , K 0 )−1 /
(ê(Cj , K 00 )ê(Dj , Kρ(j) ))ωj = ê(g1 , g1 )αs .
ρ(j)∈S

2. Recover D as C0 /ê(g1 , g2 )αs , compute sk = H1 (D) and uses sk as
a symmetric key of SE to decrypt the ciphertext c to gain a full
signature σ.
• Ver: Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK) does as follows.
1. Parse σ as (S1 , S2 , S10 , S20 , C0 , C1 , π0 , π1 ), compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ←
H0 (m), and verify whether
e(S1 , g) · e(S2−1 , ū0

k
Y

m

ūj j ) = e(ḡ1 , ḡ2 )

j=1

holds. If so, output >; if not, output ⊥.
2. Check whether
e(C00 , C00 /(ḡ3 /B)) = e(h, π0 ) and e(C10 , C10 /(APK/B)) = e(h, π1 )
hold. If either does not hold, output ⊥.
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3. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (m||S1 ||S2 ||PKi ) and C20 = C00 · C10 ,
and verify whether
e(A, BC20 )

=

e(S10 , g)

·

e((S20 )−1 , u0

k
Y

m0

uj j )

j=1

holds. If so, output >; if not, output ⊥.
• ResUser : ResUser (mA , mB , ω, SKj , PKi , APK, PM, (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )) does
as follows.
x0

0

1. Parses PKj as (g̃1 , g̃2 , g̃3 , ũ0 , ũ1 , · · · , ũk ) and SKj := (g̃2 1 , Ax3 ).
2. Compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mB ),
3. Choose a random exponent r ∈ ZZn1 and computes
S1 =

x0
g̃2 1

0

· (ū

k
Y

r
i r
ũm
i ) , and S2 = g .

i=1

4. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (m||S1 ||S2 ||PKj ).
5. Choose two random exponents t0 , t1 ∈ ZZn1 and sets
C00 = (g̃3 /B)ht0 , π0 = ((g̃3 /B)ht0 )t0 , C10 = ht1 , π1 = ((APK/B)−1 ht1 )t1 .
6. Choose r0 ← ZZn1 , and compute first t = t1 + t2 and then
S10

=A

x3

· (u

0

k
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r · Ât , and S20 = g r .

j=1

7. Set σB := (S1 , S2 , S10 , S20 , C0 , C1 , π0 , π1 ).
8. Set request := (ω, mB , σB , PKj , (M, ρ)).
• ResTTP : ResTTP (mA , PKi , (M 0 , ρ0 ), request, ASK) does as follows.
1. Parse request as (ω, mB , σB , PKj , (M, ρ)) and ω as σP and θ. If
the non-repudiation information θ is not with respect to the tuple
(σP , mA , mB , (M, ρ), (M 0 , ρ0 )), outputs ⊥.
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2. Parse σP as (S1 , S2 ), compute (m1 , · · · , mk ) ← H0 (mA ), and verify whether
e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , ū0

k
Y

m

ūj j ) = e(ḡ1 , ḡ2 )

j=1

holds. If not, output ⊥.
3. Check whether Ver(mB , σB , PKj , APK) = >. If not, output ⊥.
4. Compute (m01 , · · · , m0k ) ← H0 (mA ||S1 ||S2 ||PKi ).
5. Choose two random exponents t0 , t1 ∈ ZZn1 and sets
C00 = ht0 , π0 = ((ḡ3 /B)−1 ht0 )t0 , C10 = (APK/B)ht1 , π1 = ((APK/B)ht1 )t1 .
6. Choose r0 ← ZZn1 , and compute first t = t1 + t2 and then
S10

y

= A · (u

0

k
Y

m0

0

0

uj j )r · Ât , and S20 = g r .

j=1
0

7. Choose a random vector v ∈ ZZN
n2 , denoted v = (s, v2 , · · · , vN 0 ).
For each row Mj of M , it chooses a random rj ∈ ZZn2 .
8. Choose a random element D ∈ GT , computes sk = H1 (D), and
uses sk as a symmetric key of SE to encrypt the bit strings
S1 ||S2 ||S10 ||S20 ||C00 ||C10 ||π0 ||π1 and gains a ciphertext c̃A .
9. The credential-protected package πA is set as
c̃A , C0 = De(g1 , g1 )αs , C = g1s , C 0 = (g1γ )s ,
−r

0

r

j
, Dj = g1j , for j = 1, · · · , L0 .
Cj = (g1c )Mj ·v hρ0 (j)

0
0
0 0
10. Choose a random vector v 0 ∈ ZZN
n2 , denoted v = (s , v2 , · · · , vN ).
0
0
0
For each row Mj of M , it chooses a random rj ∈ ZZn2 .
11. Choose a random element D0 ∈ GT , computes sk 0 = H1 (D0 ), and
uses sk 0 as a symmetric key of SE to encrypt the σB and gains a
ciphertext c̃B .
12. The credential-protected package πB is set as
0

0

0

c̃B , C0 = De(g1 , g1 )αs , C = g1s , C 0 = (g1γ )s ,
0

−r0

r0

Cj = (g1c )Mj ·v hρ(j)j , Dj = g1j , for j = 1, · · · , L.
13. The output is (πA , πB ).
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Algorithms: TranP
Cost:
2E

TPVer
3P

TranS
1SE, (12 + 3L)E

TranV
1SD, (2s + 2)P, (s)E

Ver
10P

Table 1: Costs of algorithms in our instantiation of ABOFE.

5.1. Efficency Analysis
Since pairing and exponentiation operations take more time than multiplication operations do, we will simply ignore the costs of multiplication
computations here. Let SE, SD, P and E denote a symmetric encryption operation, a symmetric decryption operation and a pairing operation, and an
exponentiation operation, respectively. Let M be an L × N matrix, ρ a map
from each row Mj of M to an attribute ρ(j), and S a set of attributes that
satisfies the access structure (M, ρ). Denote s as the number of elements of
the set {1 ≤ j ≤ L|ρ(j) ∈ S}.
The costs of our instantiation of ABOFE is presented in Table 1, in which
TranS is evaluated with respect to the access structure (M, ρ), and TranV
is evaluated with respect to the set of attributes S.
6. Conclusion
We proposed the notion of attribute-based optimistic fair exchange, and
gave a formal security model. We then proposed a generic construction of
PAOFE, and proved its security under the proposed model in the standard
model. Since ABOFE can be used to solve the fair exchange problem when
the attributes of the participants need to be taken into account, ABOFE can
be viewed as an extension of OFE in the attribute-based setting.
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